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HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during theTSurvey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In Subaru of America, Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.,' the Texas
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the oft-confused doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exclusive jurisdiction with respect to proceedings before
an administrative agency.2 The supreme court explained that, "[diespite
similar terminology, primary jurisdiction is prudential whereas exclusive
jurisdiction is jurisdictional."' 3 Under the primary jurisdiction doctrine,
both the courts and the administrative agency have the authority to make
the initial determination of a matter in dispute. 4 A trial court should nev-
ertheless defer to the administrative agency, and abate any lawsuit until
the agency has made a determination, if the agency has special expertise
in the matter and a significant benefit would be derived from the agency's
uniform interpretation of its laws, rules, and regulations. 5 Under the ex-
clusive jurisdiction doctrine on the other hand, the administrative agency
is legislatively granted "the sole authority to make the initial determina-
tion in a dispute."'6 In the latter situation, a party must exhaust all admin-
istrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency's action,"
and, "until then, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction."' 7
* B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Partner, Figari Davenport &
Graves, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
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1. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. 2002).
2. Id. at 220.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 221.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court should ordinarily dismiss
claims that are within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction. Id. If the statutory scheme re-
quires the agency to make certain findings as a predicate to a court's adjudication of the
claim, however, and a party files suit prematurely, the trial court may simply abate the case
until such time as the jurisdictional impediment is removed. Id. at 221-22.
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A putative class representative had his case dismissed because he
lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief in Met-Rx USA,
Inc. v. Shipman.8 After bringing his own separate personal injury suit
arising out of his use of defendants' nutritional supplements, plaintiff
sought to represent a class action to enjoin the marketing and distribution
of those products without proper warnings.9 The trial court certified the
class, but the Waco Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.10 In doing so, the appellate
court relied on the plaintiff's own pleading, in which he alleged that he
had stopped using defendants' products."1 Based on this allegation, and
the plaintiff's testimony at the class certification hearing that he did not
plan to use such products in the future, the court concluded that he had
no individual interest in the prospective relief being requested and, there-
fore, lack standing to pursue such claims.12
In Reynolds v. Reynolds,13 the Austin Court of Appeals, sua sponte,
raised the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction over a suit for a declaration
that there was no common law marriage between the parties under Texas
law.14 The court noted that neither party had filed a divorce action in
Texas, nor would they have been able to in the immediate future given
that they did not reside in Texas.' 5 Indeed, it had been many years since
either party had any contact with the state of Texas. 16 Under these cir-
cumstances, the court of appeals held that a Texas district court was not
an appropriate forum for the declaratory judgment action, and that the
Texas courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there was a lack
of a justiciable controversy in Texas.17
As most practitioners know, a bill of review is an independent action to
set aside a judgment, and only the court that rendered the judgment has
jurisdiction over such a proceeding.' 8 The parties in Richards v. Commis-
sion for Lawyer Discipline'9 agreed on this proposition, but disagreed on
whether the case was actually brought in the proper court.20 In this re-
gard, the bill of review plaintiff styled his petition to reflect the original
cause number and court that entered the judgment, but the district clerk
filed the case with a new cause number in a different court.21 An as-
8. Met-Rx USA, Inc. v. Shipman, 62 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, pet.
denied).
9. Id. at 808-09 n.1.
10. Id. at 812.
11. Id. at 811.
12. Id. at 811-12.
13. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 86 S.W.3d 272 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet. h.).
14. Id. at 275.
15. Id. at 276-77.
16. Id. at 277.
17. Id. at 277-78.
18. See, e.g., Solomon, Lambert, Roten & Assoc., Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896, 899
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).
19. Richards v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 81 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
20. Id. at 508.
21. Id. at 508-09.
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signed judge heard the matter, and the judgment he entered reflected
that he was sitting for the latter court.22 Because there was no motion or
order reflecting a transfer of the case from the court assigned by the dis-
trict clerk back to the court that rendered the original judgment, and no
indication that the designation of the court that entered the judgment was
a typographical error, the Houston Court of Appeals, First District, re-
versed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 3
Finally, the Houston Court of Appeals, First District, in Tovias v. Wild-
wood Properties Partnership, L.P.24 discussed the proper procedure for
asserting that another court has already acquired dominant jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a suit. The court of appeals stated that district
courts in Texas are courts of general jurisdiction.25 Accordingly, the
proper procedure for asserting dominant jurisdiction when there is al-
ready another lawsuit between the parties covering the same subject mat-
ter is by plea in abatement.2 6 The district court erred, therefore, in
"granting the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the case. ''27
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
Two cases during the Survey period addressed whether a plaintiff exer-
cised reasonable diligence in effecting service of a citation so as to avoid a
statute of limitations defense.28 In Carter v. MacFadyen,2 9 the Houston
Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, confirmed that pro se plaintiffs are
held to the same standard of diligence applicable to licensed attorneys.30
The plaintiff had attempted to personally serve a physician defendant on
six separate occasions, and then ultimately moved for substituted service,
which was successfully achieved 8 1h months after filing suit.31 Despite
the foregoing, the court found that there was no explanation why the
plaintiff "kept trying to personally serve [the physician] personally for
four months, when it was clear the doctor could not or would not cooper-
ate with those efforts. '32 Because defendant's usual place of business was
readily apparent, the court held the pro se plaintiff did not exercise rea-
22. Id. at 509.
23. Id. at 509-10.
24. Tovias v. Wildwood Prop. P'ship, L.P., 67 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
25. Id. at 529.
26. Id.
27. Id.; but see McAlister v. McAlister, 75 S.W.3d 481, 486 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, pet. denied) (holding complaint regarding dominant jurisdiction was not mooted by
subsequent voluntary dismissal of first lawsuit, and trial court's order granting plea in
abatement and dismissing second lawsuit was proper).
28. A plaintiff who files suit within the limitations period, but does not serve citation
until after limitations has run, must have exercised "diligence" in effecting service or his
claim will be time-barred. See Grant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990).
29. Carter v. MacFadyen, 93 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet.
denied).
30. Id. at 313; Weaver v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 942 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1997, no pet.).




sonable diligence because he should have sought substituted service at an
earlier date.33
In Baker v. Monsanto Co.,34 the Houston Court of Appeals, First Dis-
trict, held that an intervenor's claims were barred by limitations because
it had failed to use reasonable diligence in serving the defendant. 35 In a
somewhat unusual set of facts, the plaintiff originally filed suit against
Monsanto, but Monsanto had not yet been served when an intervenor
filed its petition and attempted to serve Monsanto by certified mail, re-
turn receipt requested.36 Monsanto's counsel advised the intervenor that
it would not accept service by certified mail, as Monsanto had not yet
been served by plaintiff or appeared as a party in the action. Almost a
year later, the plaintiff did serve Monsanto, which then filed its original
answer solely to plaintiff's original petition. Notably, the intervenor did
not effectuate service on Monsanto.
Thereafter, the trial court granted Monsanto's motion for summary
judgment holding that the intervenor's claims were barred by limita-
tions. 37 On appeal, the intervenor claimed (1) it had successfully served
Monsanto during the limitations period by certified mail and, alterna-
tively, (2) Monsanto had appeared in the matter by filing its original an-
swer to plaintiff's petition prior to the expiration of the limitations
period. The court rejected both of the intervenor's arguments. First, the
court reaffirmed that an intervenor may, under Rule 21a, serve a petition
in intervention on the parties to the suit by notifying opposing counsel of
the filing of such pleadings. 38 However, citation is necessary when the
intervenor requests relief against a defendant who has not yet appeared,
which was the case in this instance. 39 Second, the court found that Mon-
santo had not received or waived required service of the intervenor's pe-
tition.40 Rather, Monsanto's answer was directed specifically to the
allegations in plaintiff's claims, not those asserted by the intervenor.41
As most practitioners are aware, to support a default judgment based
upon substituted service, the record must show that reasonable diligence
was used in seeking service on the corporation's registered agent at the
registered office. 42 In Wright Bros. Energy, Inc. v. Krough,43 the plaintiff
33. Id.; see Doue v. City of Texarkana, 786 S.W.2d 474, 477 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1990, writ denied) (a "flurry of ineffective activity does not constitute due diligence if eas-
ily available and more effective alternatives are ignored." Carter, 93 S.W.3d at 314-15).
34. Baker v. Monsanto Co., 77 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet.
filed).
35. Id. at 481.
36. Id. at 479; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a (allowing service by certified mail, return receipt
requested, on parties to a suit).
37. Baker, 77 S.W.3d at 479.
38. Id. at 480; TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a; McWilliams v. Snap-Pac Corp., 476 S.W.2d 941,
949-50 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Baker, 77 S.W.3d at 480.
40. Id. at 481.
41. Id.
42. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN. art. 2.11(b) (Vernon 2003).
43. Wright Bros. Energy, Inc. v. Krough, 67 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
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attempted to serve the corporation's registered agent by certified mail,
return receipt requested, on two separate occasions. 44 Each time, the en-
velope was returned with an indication that service was attempted but
there was no such known address. 45 The plaintiff next served the Secre-
tary of State as the corporation's agent 46 and later obtained a default
judgment.47 The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, reversed the
default judgment, however, holding that the facts in the record "were suf-
ficient to put a party attempting service by mail on notice that there was a
problem with the address. ''48 Thus, because the returned citation did not
reflect why it was returned or rejected, the court held the plaintiff did not
exercise reasonable diligence as a matter of law.49
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
As most practitioners are aware, special appearances are subject to the
due order of pleading requirement. Two cases during the Survey period
addressed whether a defendant waived its special appearance, thereby
subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
In Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche,50 the San Antonio Court of Appeals
held that the defendant, who had received an adverse ruling on a motion
to compel, did not waive its special appearance by filing in the appellate
court a petition for writ of mandamus and motion for emergency stay and
temporary injunction, without stating that the pleadings were subject to
the defendant's special appearance. 51 First, the court held the petition
and motion were not "pleadings," because they did not allege a cause of
action or a ground of defense.52 Second, "jurisdiction of the various trial
courts and appellate courts is independently conferred by law."' 53 There-
fore, the court held that a party's appearance before an appellate court
did not constitute a general appearance before the trial court.54 Finally,
the court held that "the use of mandamus proceedings to challenge dis-
covery orders [constituted] a 'use of discovery processes' envisioned by
Rule 120a" and, therefore, did not run afoul of the limitations regarding
special appearances. 55
44. Id. at 272-73.
45. Id.
46. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr. ANN. art. 2.11(b).
47. Krough, 67 S.W.3d at 273.
48. Id. at 274.
49. Id. at 275.
50. Gutierrez v. Deloitte & Touche, No. 04-01-00637-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2195
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 27, 2002), as supplemented 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 823
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 29, 2003, pet filed).
51. Id. at *4.
52. Id. at *6-7.
53. Id. at *7.
54. Id.
55. Id.; TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a(1) provides: "The issuance of process for witnesses, the
taking of depositions, the serving of requests for admissions, and the use of discovery
processes, shall not constitute a waiver of such special appearance."
2003] 1227
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In Von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, S.C. v. French,56 the Amarillo Court
of Appeals reminded practitioners "that once a party has filed an answer
or otherwise appeared" in a lawsuit, "he is before the court for all pur-
poses," including cross-actions. 57 In this case, although the defendant
had filed an answer in response to plaintiff's petition, when its co-defen-
dant asserted cross-claims, it filed a special appearance and moved to dis-
miss those cross-claims. The court of appeals, of course, held that the
defendant had already appeared in the matter.58
IV. VENUE
The Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, in Reliant Energy,
Inc. v. Gonzales,59 reconciled arguably conflicting venue provisions in the
Texas Probate Code and Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. In
this wrongful death action, the plaintiff first filed suit in the Hidalgo
County probate court where her husband's estate was being probated.
While venue was arguably proper in Hidalgo County under sections 5A
and 5B of the Texas Probate Code, venue was not proper against Reliant
under the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code.60 Reliant moved to
transfer venue of the wrongful death action to Harris County, which the
probate court denied. 61 The plaintiff then filed a second suit in the Harris
County district court asserting the same claims and seeking the same re-
lief as in her probate court suit. The plaintiff then moved to consolidate
both wrongful death actions in Hidalgo County before the probate court.
However, Reliant answered the Harris County suit and filed a counter-
claim seeking an anti-suit injunction. The Hidalgo probate court subse-
quently granted the consolidation motion and the Harris County court
denied Reliant's request for injunctive relief.62 In resolving the conflict
between the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code and the Texas Pro-
bate Code, the court of appeals noted that both courts had subject-matter
jurisdiction over the wrongful death action. Under section 15.007 of the
Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, however, the general venue
statute prevails in the event of a conflict with venue provisions of the
Texas Probate Code in an administrator's suit for personal injury, death,
or property damage.63
In In re Pepsico, Inc.,64 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that an
amended motion to transfer venue, which contained a mandatory venue
56. Von Briesen, Purtell & Roper, S.C. v. French, 78 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2002, pet. dism'd w.o.j.).
57. Id. at 575.
58. Id.
59. Reliant Energy, Inc. v. Gonzales, No. 01-02-00679-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS
6655, (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 6, 2002, pet. denied), vacated, 2003 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3665 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 29, 2003).
60. Id. at *8.
61. Id. at *4-5.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *14-15.
64. In re Pepsico, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet. h.).
1228 [Vol. 56
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argument not advanced in the original motion, was timely asserted prior
to the venue hearing.65 In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court
analogized to the former plea of privilege, and noted that a timely
amendment to a plea of privilege was permitted and did relate back to
the filing of the initial pleading.66 The court held that the same pleading
amendment rules should apply to the current motion to transfer
practice. 67
V. PARTIES
Once again, class actions were a hot topic during the Survey period. In
two cases, the Texas Supreme Court had the opportunity to refine and
further explain its holding in Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal.68 In
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe,69 the Texas Supreme Court held that it
had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from an order certifying a
class action because the certification order failed to follow Bernal in two
respects. 70 First, the court held that the trial court's certification order
failed to demonstrate how the class "claims will likely be tried so that
conformance with Rule 42 may be meaningfully evaluated. ' 71 The Aus-
tin Court of Appeals had held that the trial court's certification order
satisfied Bernal's requirements because
the certification hearing was lengthy, the trial court identified a num-
ber of factual and legal issues common to class members, disgorge-
ment of amounts paid was the plaintiffs' "primary measure of
damages" and could be proved from [the defendant's] records, "reli-
ance was not a critical issue," and, finally, proof of consequential and
other damages was manageable. 72
The Texas Supreme Court disagreed, however, holding that the plaintiffs
had not abandoned certain other causes of action and damage claims not
addressed in the certification order, and that these issues would present
problems on a class basis.73
Second, the supreme court held that the trial court had failed to follow
Bernal's requirement that "[c]ourts must perform a 'rigorous analysis'
before ruling on class certification to determine whether all prerequisites
to certification have been met."' 74 In particular, the certification order
did not set forth any plan for trying plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the
court held that the trial court had failed to satisfy Bernal's requirements
65. Id. at 794.
66. Id. at 792-93.
67. Id. at 793.
68. Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. 2000).
69. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 103, No. 00-1162, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 178 (Oct. 31,
2002).
70. Id. at *41.
71. Id. at *31.
72. Id. at *33.
73. Id. at *32.
74. Id. at *37-38.
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and the court of appeals' review was inadequate. 75 In fact, the court of
appeals had merely stated that we are confident that any individual dam-
ages issues may be resolved in a "manageable, time efficient, yet fair
manner. '"76 The supreme court found that the court of appeals had
"brushed aside arguments that the trial court had not explained how
other individual issues like reliance and other claims, like fraud, would be
tried."'77 Accordingly, the court reaffirmed its position that "Bernal re-
quires actual, demonstrated compliance with Rule 42."78
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lopez,79 the Texas
Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to review a class
certification order because the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals' opinion
did not conflict with Bernal.80 In Lopez, the appellant argued that Bernal
"required the trial court to examine the merits of the plaintiffs' claims
before certifying a class." 81 The court of appeals disagreed and was af-
firmed by the supreme court, which held that "Bernal does not require
trial courts to evaluate the merits of the plaintiffs' claims" when deter-
mining whether to certify the class.82
In Wood v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co.,83 the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals addressed the circumstances under which a trial judge may
change his mind and de-certify a class, which he had previously certified
and which certification had been affirmed by the court of appeals.84 The
court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in de-certify-
ing the class for two reasons. "First, the trial court [had] acknowledged
that it initially certified the class" prior to the Texas Supreme Court's
opinion in Bernal.85 "Second.... as the case developed, the trial [court]
became increasingly aware of the difficulty of managing [the] litigation as
a class action."'86 In particular, the trial "judge remarked ... during the
hearing on the motion to decertify that, in his opinion, [the] class action
was not manageable, and that the plaintiffs, defendants, and especially
the jury would be 'at a disadvantage' were [the] matter to proceed to trial
as a class action."87
75. Id. at *36-37.
76. Id. at *39-40.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 129, No. 01-0540, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 176
(Oct. 31, 2002) (per curiam).
80. Id. at *34.
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id. at *34.
83. Wood v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 69 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2001, no pet.).
84. Id. at 237.






The omission of parties in amended pleadings was once again a popular
topic during the Survey period. In Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat
Exploration Co.,88 several plaintiffs sued Sonat Exploration Co. and
Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. for damages arising out of a gas well blow-
out. Sonat cross-claimed for contractual indemnity against Cudd, and
filed a separate lawsuit against Brooks Well Servicing Company, also for
contractual indemnity.89 The trial court consolidated the two lawsuits
and then severed the contractual indemnity claims.90 Immediately before
the severed indemnity claims were to proceed to trial, Brooks filed a mo-
tion to continue, which the trial court granted. 91 However, the trial court
also held that Sonat's claims against Cudd should go forward as sched-
uled.92 Notably, although the trial court ordered separate trials, it did not
sever Sonat's claims against Brooks and Cudd into separate suits. 93
"Less than two weeks after the trial court ordered separate trials, and
less than ten days before the trial [on Sonat's claims against Cudd], Sonat
filed its second and third amended petitions. '94 In those amended peti-
tions, Sonat omitted any reference to Brooks in either the caption or the
body of those petitions.95 Accordingly, Brooks argued that Sonat had
non-suited its claims against it.96 Although the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals recognized the general rule that the omission of a defendant from a
plaintiff's amended petition has the affect of dismissing that defendant
from the lawsuit, it found that the general rule was inapplicable under
these facts. 97 Rather, the court held that in cases involving multiple par-
ties, "after there has been an order for separate trials ... a plaintiff does
not automatically dismiss a previously-named party . . . by filing
[amended] pleadings pertaining to one separate trial that omit that party
whose rights or liabilities are the subject of another separate trial in the
same case." 98
In Green v. Vidlak,99 the plaintiff amended its petition after the trial
court sustained one of the defendant's special exceptions. 00 Although
both defendants remained in the style of the amended petition, one of the
defendants was completely omitted from the body of the pleading. 01
Under these facts, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the omitted
88. Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat Exploration Co., 74 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
89. Id. at 187.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 187-88.






99. Green v. Vidlak, 76 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).




defendant had been non-suited by the plaintiff.10 2
In Doyer v. Pitney Bowes, Inc.,10 3 the Austin Court of Appeals ana-
lyzed whether claims asserted in plaintiff's original petition, which were
otherwise barred by limitations, constituted a counter-claim such that
they would not be barred by limitations under section 16.069 of the Texas
Civil Practice & Remedies Code.10 4 In this matter, Randolph Doyer and
Pitney Bowes, Inc. executed a rental contract for a postage meter ma-
chine. Additionally, Doyer and Pitney Bowes' subsidiary, Pitney Bowes
Credit Corporation, executed a rental contract for mailroom equipment.
Pitney Bowes initially sued Doyer in a justice of the peace court alleging
that he had breached the postage meter contract. 10 5 However, that case
did not proceed to trial. Thereafter, Doyer filed suit in district court
against Pitney Bowes and Pitney Bowes Credit alleging damages pertain-
ing exclusively to the mailroom equipment contract.10 6 Although Pitney
Bowes was not a party to the mailroom equipment contract, Doyer al-
leged that the two entities were co-conspirators acting as a single business
enterprise. 107
Pitney Bowes moved for summary judgment alleging that Doyer's
claims were barred by limitations. In response, Doyer argued that his
lawsuit was "filed in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim to the law-
suit filed by [Pitney Bowes] in ... the small claims court."' 0 8 In particu-
lar, Doyer argued that only the district court had jurisdiction to decide his
"counterclaim" because his damages exceeded the jurisdictional limit of
the small claims court. 109 Based on the foregoing, Doyer claimed that
section 16.069 precluded the court from determining his claims were
barred by limitations."10
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that section 16.069 did not ex-
tend the limitation period for Doyer's claims against Pitney Bowes."'
First, the court found that Doyer's claims pertaining to the mailroom
equipment contract were independent causes of action contained in a
plaintiff's petition and, therefore, did not constitute counterclaims." 2
102. Id. at 120.
103. Doyer v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 80 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied).
104. Id. at 217-18. Section 16.069 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
provides:
(a) If a counterclaim or cross-claim arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence that is the basis of an action, a party to that action may file the
counterclaim or cross-claim even though as a separate action it would be
barred by limitation on the date the party's answer is required.
(b) The counterclaim or cross-claim must be filed no later than the 30th day
after the date on which the party's answer is required.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.069 (Vernon 1997).
105. Doyer, 80 S.W.3d at 216-17.
106. Id. at 217.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 218.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 219.
112. Id. at 219-20.
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Second, the court found that it was immaterial that Doyer could not bring
the alleged counterclaim in small claims court because of the jurisdic-
tional limits. 113 The court found that "[wihen a counterclaim is compul-
sory, as Doyer [was claiming], the defendant is not at liberty to decline
battle in the forum chosen by the plaintiff.""14 Rather, the court held
that Doyer had produced no evidence that he could not have filed his
alleged counterclaim, within the limitations period, in a court having
jurisdiction.' 15
VII. DISCOVERY
The Texas appellate courts had more opportunities to interpret the
1999 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure during the Sur-
vey period.
A. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES AND SCOPE
In re Shipmon' 16 addressed authorizations for the disclosure of medical
records and bills in personal injury suits. The Amarillo Court of Appeals
noted that new Rule 194.2,117 governing requests for disclosures, specifi-
cally provides for the production of "medical records and bills ... or, in
lieu thereof, an authorization permitting [their] disclosure. 11 8 The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the trial court's order requiring her
to provide such an authorization was unauthorized because it required
her to produce documents that were not already in existence. 119 Instead,
the court construed that the trial court's order, and presumably Rule
194.2 itself, as impliedly requiring the party seeking discovery to prepare
the form of authorization and the responding party merely to sign it.120
Rule 192.3(f) 121 specifically provides that an insurance policy that may
provide coverage for a claim is discoverable. 122 The plaintiff in In re Se-
nior Living Properties, L.L.C 23 sought additional discovery regarding
the defendants' insurance coverage, however, namely the deposition of a
witness with knowledge of the extent to which such insurance had already
been eroded, the effect of any pending litigation on the available cover-
age, and the self-insured retention applicable to the case. 124 The defend-
ants argued that this information was not discoverable, but the Tyler
113. Id. at 220.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. In re Shipmon, 68 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]).
117. TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.2.
118. TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.2(j), (k); see Shipmon, 68 S.W.3d at 819-20.
119. Shipmon, 68 S.W.3d at 818-19.
120. Id. at 819.
121. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(f).
122. Id.
123. In re Senior Living Props., L.L.C., 63 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2002, orig.
proceeding).
124. Id. at 596-97.
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Court of Appeals disagreed. 125 The court reasoned that the specific au-
thorization of Rule 192.3(f) should not be read as a limitation on any
additional discovery related to the insurance policy. 126 Moreover, the
court rebuffed the defendants' arguments that they might be required to
disclose confidential settlements in other cases, or privileged analysis of
pending litigation, noting that objections on those bases could be raised
in response to specific questions that might be posed to the deponent.
12 7
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray128 involved the interplay between
the discoverability of documents and the sealing of court records. Com-
paq appealed a trial court's order unsealing certain documents that had
been filed as part of the plaintiffs' class certification motion. 129 Compaq
complained, under several different issues it presented on appeal, that the
trial court should not have conducted a hearing under Rule 76a 130 be-
cause the documents in question either were not discoverable, were not
"legitimately" court records, or did not relate to the class certification
issues.13' The Beaumont Court of Appeals rejected each of these argu-
ments, noting that once documents are actually filed with the court, as
they were in this case, they are indisputably "court records" within the
meaning of Rule 76a(2)(a) 132 and, therefore, the procedures required by
Rule 76a must then be followed.133
B. PRIVILEGES AND EXEMPTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of legislative immunity
from discovery in In re Perry.134 The court held that when a person acts
in a legislative capacity, then both he and his legislative aides may claim
immunity from having to give testimony regarding those actions.' 35 The
court further held, however, that such immunity can be waived like any
other privilege. 136 Moreover, the court considered, but did not have to
decide, whether a legislator's testimonial privilege might also be "subject
to limited, very closely guarded exceptions when invidious legislative in-
tent is an element of a cause of action."'1 37 The court noted that, even if it
were to recognize such an exception, the party seeking the testimony
would have to have first exhausted all other available evidentiary sources,
125. Id. at 597.
126. Id. at 597.
127. Id. at 598.
128. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 75 S.W.3d 669 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002),
affd, 79 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, pet filed).
129. Id. at 670-71.
130. TEX. R. Civ. P. § 76a.
131. Compaq, 75 S.W.3d at 672-74.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. § 76a(2)(a) (defining court records to include "all documents of
any nature filed in connection with any matter before any civil court").
133. Compaq, 75 S.W.3d at 672-74.
134. In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857 (Tex. 2001).
135. Id. at 858.
136. Id. at 862.
137. Id. at 861.
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which had not happened in the case before it.138
A party's use of videotaped statements from its employees in a media-
tion led to a discovery dispute in In re Learjet Inc.139 After the mediation
failed, the opposing party requested production of both the edited video-
tapes it had seen and the unedited original tapes. 140 The Texarkana
Court of Appeals rejected the relator's argument that the videotapes
were privileged or otherwise not discoverable simply because they were
prepared for the mediation. 14 1 According to the court, the relevant ques-
tion was whether the substance of the videotapes was itself protected by
the attorney-client privilege. 142 Although the videotapes consisted of the
employer's attorney questioning the employees, the court concluded that
this content did not fall within the attorney-client privilege, apparently
because the communications were expressly intended to be shared with
the opposing party at mediation. 143 Moreover, the court pointed out that
the employees interviewed had also been designated as testifying expert
witnesses, and the tapes would be discoverable on that basis as well. 144
In re Lincoln Electric Co.145 demonstrates the far less rigid approach to
the preservation of privilege claims reflected in the 1999 amendments to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, the relator filed motions
for protective order with respect to the timing of a subpoena duces tecum
served with a deposition notice, and then served objections to the specific
document requests themselves as being "overly broad, vague, ambiguous,
and not document-specific.' 46 Only after these objections were over-
ruled did relator serve a supplemental response raising claims of attor-
ney-client and work product privilege, and indicating that it was
withholding documents on that basis. 147 The parties seeking discovery
responded with a motion to compel arguing that these privilege claims
were untimely and were therefore waived. 148 After initially indicating
that it would review the disputed documents in camera to determine if
they were in fact privileged, the trial judge ultimately entered an order
ruling that any privilege had been waived.1 49
The Beaumont Court of Appeals conditionally granted relator's writ of
138. Id. at 861-62.
139. In re Learjet Inc., 59 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, orig. proceeding
[mand. dism'd]).
140. Id. at 844.
141. Id. at 845 (citing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(c) (Vernon Supp.
2001) (written material used in mediation is discoverable if it is discoverable independent
of the mediation)).
142. Learjet, 59 S.W.3d at 845.
143. Id. at 846.
144. Id. at 846-47. The court was probably on less solid ground when, as part of its basis
for rejecting the privilege claim, it explained that the tapes did not include explicit discus-
sions of legal strategies or advice. Id. at 846.
145. In re Lincoln Electric Co., 91 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002, orig. pro-
ceeding [mand. denied]).
146. Id. at 433-34.
147. Id. at 434.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 434-35.
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mandamus from this ruling.150 In surveying the rules governing objecting
and asserting privilege, the court observed that "significant effort was
made by the promulgators of the Rules to avoid waiver by a party when
privileged materials or information may be at issue."'1 51 The court opined
that "the spirit, if not the letter, of this prophylactic effort" is defeated
where a trial court does not expressly rule on a privilege assertion based
on evidence presented and/or in camera inspection of the materials. 152
Thus, the court held, "[i]n keeping with the overall spirit of non-waiver
apparent in the applicable discovery rules," a party responding to discov-
ery may first make objections based on overbreadth, relevance and the
like, have those objections ruled upon, and only then be required to as-
sert privilege under Rule 193.3.153
C. SUPPLEMENTATION OF DISCOVERY RESPONSES
The 1999 rule amendments also significantly increased the flexibility of
trial courts in dealing with a party's failure to properly disclose fact or
expert witnesses. As a result, cases decided during the Survey period
were far more likely to allow the disputed witness's testimony than were
cases in years past. The Texarkana Court of Appeals in City of Paris v.
McDowell,1 54 for example, held that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in allowing the testimony of plaintiff's expert, despite defendant's
complaints about deficiencies in the plaintiff's disclosure regarding the
expert's qualifications and the substance of his opinions. 155 Similarly, in
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Bailey,' 56 the Austin Court of Appeals
allowed the plaintiff's medical expert to testify to a revised opinion-
from "asbestosis with no impairment" to "asbestosis with mild impair-
ment"-even though the plaintiff never supplemented his previous dis-
covery response. 157
Rule 193.6(a)158 provides that, even if a party fails to timely disclose
the identity of a fact or expert witness, the trial court may still allow the
witness to testify if there is no unfair surprise or prejudice to the other
parties. 59 The El Paso Court of Appeals in Gutierrez v. Gutierrez160
availed itself of this "alternative to the draconian sanction of automatic
exclusion," where the appellee failed to identify her attorney as an expert
witness on attorneys' fees.16' The court noted that the appellee had iden-
150. Id. at 438.
151. Id. at 436 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.6, 193.2, and 193.3).
152. Id.
153. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3; Lincoln Electric, 91 S.W.3d at 437.
154. City of Paris v. McDowell, 79 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. ref'd).
155. Id. at 605-08.
156. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 92 S.W.3d 577 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet. h.).
157. Id. at 580-81. Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged, and the court agreed, that it would
have been the better practice to have supplemented the discovery response. Id. at 581.
158. TEx. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a).
159. Id.
160. Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.).
161. Id. at 734, 736 n.9.
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tified her attorney as a fact witness with knowledge regarding reasonable
attorneys' fees in her pretrial witness list and, subsequently, in supple-
mental interrogatory answers.1 62 Thus, the court concluded there was no
unfair surprise to the appellant. 163 In Dolenz v. State Bar of Texas,164 the
Dallas Court of Appeals allowed a previously undisclosed witness to tes-
tify at the punishment phase of a disciplinary action against an attor-
ney.1 65 The court based its decision both on the wording of the specific
interrogatory propounded by the attorney, which arguably did not call for
the witness's identity since he did not have knowledge of the facts alleged
in the State Bar's petition, and perhaps more importantly on the fact that
the trial court ordered a continuance to allow the attorney to depose the
witness.166
Other courts during the Survey period took the approach of reviewing
the exclusion of an expert witness as a "death penalty" sanction that is
subject to the strictures of TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell.'67
In Vaughn v. Ford Motor Co.,' 68 for example, the trial court had excluded
three expert witnesses whose identities were disclosed by plaintiff, but
who neither provided written reports nor were made available promptly
for their depositions in contravention of the trial court's scheduling order
and the applicable procedural rule. 169 The Eastland Court of Appeals
first found that exclusion was not mandatory under Rule 193.6,170 be-
cause the plaintiff had identified the experts and provided a synopsis of
their opinions.' 71 Thus, the court reasoned that the sanction of exclusion
had to be evaluated under TransAmerican, and under those standards the
trial court abused its discretion.172 Similarly, in In re Harvest Communi-
ties of Houston, Inc.,173 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that,
while an attorney's conduct in presenting his expert for deposition was
sanctionable, an order excluding the expert's testimony did not meet the
TransAmerican standards where the penalty fell on the party, not the at-
torney, and the trial court failed to consider less severe sanctions. 174
D. SANCTIONS
The San Antonio Court of Appeals in In re U-Haul International,
162. Id. at 732-33.
163. Id. at 736.
164. Dolenz v. State Bar of Tex., 72 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.).
165. Id. at 387.
166. Id.
167. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991).
168. Vaughn v. Ford Motor Co., 91 S.W.3d 387 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. filed).
169. Id. at 389 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 195.3).
170. TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.6(a).
171. Vaughn, 91 S.W.3d at 391.
172. Id. at 391-92. The court ultimately found the error was harmless, however, as the
defendants were entitled to a directed verdict in any event. Id. at 394.
173. In re Harvest Cmty. of Houston, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.).
174. Id. at 348-49.
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Inc.175 held that the relator, U-Haul International, could not be sanc-
tioned for failing to produce records belonging to its insurer and sister
corporation, Republic Western Insurance. 176 U-Haul argued that it had
asked Republic for the documents, but the latter refused to honor the
request. 77 Recognizing the separate identity of the corporations, and
finding that there was no evidence of alter ego, the court held that U-
Haul did not have "possession, custody, or control" of the documents.1 78
Although the court's reasoning would appear to be equally applicable
where the entity in possession of the documents is a subsidiary of the
responding party, it might be difficult to justify the same result on a the-
ory that a parent corporation does not have the right to obtain possession
of its subsidiary's documents.
In Finlay v. Olive,179 the Houston Court of Appeals, First District, re-
versed the trial court's imposition of sanctions for pretrial discovery
abuse. a80 The court first noted that the trial judge had not conducted any
sanctions hearing, designated as such, after notice to the parties.' 8'
Moreover, because the appellee was relying on proceedings during and
after trial as constituting the sanctions hearing, any request for sanctions
based on discovery abuse that the appellee was aware of before trial was
waived once she proceeded to trial without obtaining a hearing and ruling
on that request.182
Finally, the Texas courts continued to closely scrutinize so-called death
penalty sanctions during the Survey period. For example, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals in In re Adkins183 overturned the trial court's proposed
instruction to the jury that the relators had knowledge of a dog's vicious
propensities, which it concluded was tantamount to a death penalty sanc-
tion.'8 4 The court held that, while the trial court recited that it had con-
sidered the possibility of less severe sanctions and concluded they would
be ineffective, it did not explain why.185 Similarly, in Cummings v.
Cire,'86 in which the alleged discovery abuse included the forging of doc-
uments and intentional destruction of evidence, the Amarillo Court of
Appeals reversed an order striking the plaintiff's pleadings because the
court had not previously sanctioned plaintiff herself (as opposed to her
attorneys) and had not properly explained why lesser sanctions would not
175. In re U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. pro-
ceeding [mand. denied]).
176. Id. at 656-57.
177. Id. at 655.
178. Id. at 656-57.
179. Finlay v. Olive, 76 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
180. Id. at 526.
181. Id. at 525.
182. Id. at 525-26 (citing Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. 1993)).
183. In re Adkins, 70 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, orig. proceeding).
184. Id. at 389-90.
185. Id. at 391.
186. Cummings v. Cire, 74 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. granted).
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have been effective. 187 Magnuson v. Mullen'88 teaches, however, that
where a plaintiff "persistently" fails to comply with discovery and makes
no attempt to secure discovery from the other side, and lesser sanctions
have already been imposed, a trial court may justifiably assume that the
plaintiff's discovery abuse demonstrates a lack of merit to his claim and
enter the ultimate sanction of dismissal. 189
VII. DISMISSAL
The Houston appellate courts expressed conflicting views regarding the
extent of a trial court's plenary powers to levy sanctions following the
filing of a nonsuit. In In re T.G.,190 the Houston Court of Appeals, First
District, held that, even where a party's motion for sanctions had been
filed prior to the entry of an order granting a non-suit, a trial court has no
power to enter sanctions once its plenary power expires.' 91 In so holding,
the court expressly declined to follow the holding of its sister court in
Mattly v. Spiegel Inc.,192 which affirmed the entry of a sanction award
entered after the expiration of the trial court's plenary power.193
In In re Martinez,194 the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that the
granting of a motion for new trial after a notice of nonsuit was beyond
the trial court's jurisdiction and amounted to a void order. 195 In this case,
the Donna Independent School District ("DISD") filed a suit in which
the relator intervened and counterclaimed against DISD. DISD subse-
quently non-suited its claims against the original defendant, and the rela-
tor then non-suited his claims against DISD.196 Prior to the expiration of
the trial court's plenary power, however, the DISD filed a motion for new
trial in order to assert a counterclaim against the relator, which the trial
court granted. 197 The relator then filed his petition for a writ of manda-
mus, and the court of appeals entered a stay order. The DISD then non-
suited its claims against the relator. 198 In addition to disapproving of the
DISD's violation of its stay order, the appellate court held that following
the relator's nonsuit there remained no justiciable claim in the lawsuit,
and the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant DISD's motion
187. Id. at 928-29. The court rejected the trial court's conclusion that a monetary sanc-
tion would have been ineffective because the plaintiff lacked the resources to pay, noting
that the justice system will not allow the most severe penalty to be imposed simply because
a litigant lacks the money to pay a fine. Id. at 928.
188. Magnusson v. Mullen, 65 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied).
189. Id. at 828.
190. In re T.G., 68 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
191. Id. at 177.
192. Mattly v. Spiegel, Inc., 19 S.W.3d 890 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.).
193. T.G., 68 S.W.3d at 179.
194. In re Martinez, 77 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, orig. proceeding).
195. Id. at 465.





for new trial. 199
The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Pace Concerts, Ltd. v.
Resendez2°° held that, even in the context of a no-evidence summary
judgment motion, the plaintiff retains an absolute right of non-suit after a
summary judgment hearing, but before the trial court enters its ruling.201
The court rejected the appellants' argument that the plaintiff's nonsuit
came too late since he had already been required to present his evidence
in responding to the no-evidence motion.20 2 In addition, the court held
that the defendant's counterclaim for declaratory judgment and attor-
neys' fees did not preclude the dismissal of the entire action either, be-
cause the declaratory judgment action essentially mirrored the plaintiff's
claim and was framed in terms of the defendant's non-liability. 20 3
Slaughter v. Clement204 held that the plaintiff in an action may not be
defaulted for failing to appear at trial; rather, the trial court may only
dismiss the suit for failure to appear, following proper notice and a hear-
ing, and such a dismissal does not constitute an adjudication on the merits
of the plaintiff's claims.205 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Seals,20 6 an in-
carcerated prisoner filed a divorce proceeding, which the trial court sub-
sequently dismissed for want of prosecution when the plaintiff failed to
appear at a dismissal hearing. The Texarkana Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dis-
missing the suit since the plaintiff had made it known to the trial court
that a bench warrant would be required to secure his attendance at the
hearing.207
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Texas Supreme Court in Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons
Corp.208 held that
a motion for leave to file a late summary judgment response should
be granted when the nonmovant establishes good cause by showing
that the failure to timely respond (1) was not intentional or the result
of conscious indifference, but the result of an accident or mistake,
and (2) that allowing the late response will occasion no undue delay
or otherwise injure the party seeking summary judgment.20 9
199. Id. at 464-65.
200. Pace Concerts, Ltd. v. Resendez, 72 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
pet. denied).
201. Id. at 702.
202. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 162 (plaintiff may nonsuit anytime before he has intro-
duced all of his evidence).
203. Resendez, 72 S.W.3d at 703.
204. Slaughter v. Clement, 64 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, no pet.).
205. Id. at 450.
206. In re Marriage of Seals, 83 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
207. Id. at 874.
208. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 45 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1031, 2002 Tex.
LEXIS 120 (July 3, 2002, pet. granted), substituted opinion, 98 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2002).
209. Id. at *3.
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In so holding, the supreme court expressly rejected the application of the
test announced in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines210 for setting aside
default judgments to these summary judgment procedures.21' Based on
this standard, the supreme court affirmed the summary judgment, holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a calen-
daring error by the respondent's counsel did not constitute good cause for
failing to timely file a summary judgment response.212
The Texas Supreme Court in Jacobs v. Satterwhite213 held that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on a claim not addressed in
the summary judgment motion.21 4 However, in Beathard Joint Venture v.
West Houston Airport Corp.,215 the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that
while it is normally improper to grant summary judgment on a ground
not asserted by the movant, "this requirement can be waived if the appel-
lant fails to raise an issue on appeal [by] complaining of the trial court's
error or arguing that the excess relief was [improper]. '2 16
Both the Dallas and Houston Courts of Appeal opined on the subject
of when sufficient time had passed for the filing of no-evidence summary
judgment motions. In Restaurant Teams International, Inc. v. MG Securi-
ties Corp.,217 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in considering a no-evidence motion where only
seven months had elapsed between the date the plaintiff filed suit and the
date the defendants moved for summary judgment.218 The court rejected
the appellant's "bright line" argument that Rule 166a(i)2 1 9 prohibits the
filing of a no-evidence summary judgment prior to the expiration of the
discovery period provided in Rule 190.3220 in the absence of the entry of
a scheduling order.22' In Gourrier v. Joe Meyer Motors, Inc.,222 the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, held that the comment to Rule
166a does not prohibit the imposition of a summary judgment deadline or
thirty days before the close of discovery, and the plaintiff's motion to
continue the summary judgment hearing failed to show that there was an
210. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939) (holding
that the standard for motions for new trial on default judgments is whether (1) the failure
to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of an
accident or mistake, (2) the motion for new trial sets up a meritorious defense, and (3)
granting the motion will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff).
211. Carpenter, 2002 Tex. LEXIS 120, at *3.
212. Id. at *3-4; accord Neely v. Coleman Enters., Ltd., 62 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.-
Waco 2001, pet. denied).
213. Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2001).
214. Id. at 655.
215. Beathard Joint Venture v. W. Houston Airport Corp., 72 S.W.3d 426 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
216. Id. at 436.
217. Rest. Teams Int'l, Inc. v. MG Secs. Corp., 95 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002,
no pet.).
218. Id. at 340.
219. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
220. TEX, R. Civ. P. 190.3.
221. Rest. Teams Int'l, 95 S.W.3d at 340.
222. Gourrier v. Joe Meyer Motors, No. 14-00-01165-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5839
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 8, 2002, no pet.).
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inadequate time for discovery or how additional time would have added
anything other than needless expense.223
In Merchandise Center, Inc. v. WNS, Inc.,224 the summary judgment
respondent filed both a written response and an appendix containing sup-
porting summary judgment materials. While the attorney submitted an
affidavit stating that both the response and the appendix had been filed
simultaneously, for inexplicable reasons the appendix was not marked by
the clerk's office as timely received along with the response. In the ab-
sence of an order from the trial court granting leave to consider the late-
filed summary judgment materials, the Texarkana Court of Appeals con-
cluded that it could not consider the appendix on appeal.22 5
In Aguilar v. LVDVD, L. C., 226 the El Paso Court of Appeals held that,
while normally it is not proper to consider a reporter's record of a sum-
mary judgment hearing on appeal, such a record may be properly consid-
ered where it contains the trial court's rulings on evidentiary objections to
the summary judgment submissions.22 7 Regarding the preservation of
such objections, the Texarkana Court of Appeals in Trusty v. Strayhorn2 28
held that a statement by the trial court that it "considered" evidentiary
objections is not tantamount to a ruling thereon. 22 9 Moreover, the court
concluded that a party seeking to challenge the admissibility of summary
judgment evidence is obligated to obtain a ruling on those objections to
preserve the point for appeal, regardless of whether he is arguing for af-
firmance or reversal.230 The court also held that a party's failure to desig-
nate a witness as an expert, and then submitting a summary judgment
affidavit from the expert, was not by itself sufficient to render the expert's
opinion inadmissible.231 Rather, the opposing party was required to pre-
sent the issue to the trial court and obtain a ruling.2 32
In Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortgage Co.,233 the Dallas Court of
Appeals rejected the appellant's argument that under Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure 193.7 a party's own documents are deemed to be self-
authenticated by virtue of their production in the litigation.234 Rather, the
court held that a party must properly authenticate its own documents and
may not rely on Rule 193.7, which only applies to authentication of docu-
223. Id. at *4-5.
224. Merch. Ctr., Inc. v. WNS, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no
pet.).
225. Id. at 394-95. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting a motion to
dismiss certain claims because Texas procedure does not recognize a motion to dismiss, and
that the proper procedural tool was to complete at least one round of special exceptions
before dismissing any claims. Id. at 392-94.
226. Aguilar v. LVDVD, L.C., 70 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied).
227. Id. at 917.
228. Trusty v. Strayhorn, 87 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.).
229. Id. at 761.
230. Id. at 763-64.
231. Id. at 764.
232. Id.
233. Blanche v. First Nationwide Mortgage Co., 74 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2002, no pet.).
234. Id. at 451.
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ments produced by another party.235
The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of a summary
judgment in Yarbrough's Dirt Pit, Inc. v. Turner,236 holding that, although
the expert testimony relied upon by the defendant was conclusory, it
came from the plaintiff's own expert, whose statements were deemed to
be admissions of the party opponent and were therefore admissible.
237
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court again addressed the issue of the final-
ity of summary judgment orders in Ritzell v. Espeche,238 in light of the
court's prior holding in Lehman v. Har-Con Corp.2 3 9 In Ritzell, after the
movant filed his summary judgment motion, the respondent filed an
amended pleading asserting new claims six days before the summary
judgment hearing. The movant then sought leave to file an amended
summary judgment motion three days prior to the hearing to address the
newly-asserted claims. The trial court did not enter an order granting the
movant leave to amend his summary judgment motion, but did enter a
docket notation to that effect.2 40 The trial court then entered a "Final
Summary Judgment" purporting to dispose of all claims and all parties. 24'
Without addressing the propriety of such an order, the supreme court
held that the intermediate appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal
as interlocutory. 242
X. JURY PRACTICE
The Austin Court of Appeals in In re Bradle243 confirmed that where a
party has requested the bifurcation of the punitive damage phase of a
trial from the underlying liability and damages issues, the same jury that
decides the underlying issues must also hear and determine the issue of
punitive damages. 244 The failure to allow the initial jury to determine the
punitive damage claims constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial
court and a denial of the parties' constitutional due process rights and
right to trial by the jury impaneled to decide to the dispute. 245
The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Chavarria v. Valley Transit Co.,
Inc.,246 rejected the plaintiffs' juror misconduct argument, holding that
the communications between jurors that plaintiffs contended evidenced
misconduct were not admissible under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
235. Id. at 451-52.
236. Yarbrough's Dirt Pit, Inc. v. Turner, 65 S.W.3d 210 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2002,
pet. denied).
237. Id. at 214-15.
238. Ritzell v. Espeche, 87 S.W.3d 536 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
239. Lehman v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001).
240. Ritzell, 87 S.W.3d at 536.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 537.
243. In re Bradle, 83 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]).
244. Id. at 926.
245. Id. at 927-28.




or the Texas Rules of Evidence,24 7 even though such communications oc-
curred during a break in the jury's deliberations.248 Specifically the court
held "jurors discussing the case on breaks during deliberations is the
same as deliberations themselves" and are therefore inadmissible to
prove juror misconduct. 249
In Suggs v. Fitch,250 the plaintiff complained that the trial court erred in
its method of polling the jury following the entry of a 10-2 verdict. Spe-
cifically, the Texarkana Court of Appeals sua sponte polled the jury after
deliberations had concluded, but only asked nine of the ten jurors about
their verdict.251 The appellate court held that because the plaintiff had
not requested the court to poll the jury and had not objected to its meth-
odology, he waived any right to complain about the trial court's conduct
in that regard.252 Moreover, because the tenth juror, who was not polled,
had actually read the verdict aloud in open court and affirmatively repre-
sented to the court that ten jurors had signed the verdict, the court of
appeals determined that any error was harmless. 2
53
XI. JURY CHARGE
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of deemed findings in
Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Low.254 The trial court in this case had ren-
dered judgment on a jury verdict for $12,100, but the court of appeals
deemed a finding to support recovery under the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act of $22,100 in damages and $150,000 in attorneys fees and ren-
dered judgment in that higher amount.255 The supreme court reversed,
holding that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 279,256 by its terms, only al-
lows a deemed finding in support of a trial court's judgment.257 Thus, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals erred in relying on the rule not to support
the trial court's judgment, but to render its own judgment for a signifi-
cantly greater recovery. 258 The majority opinion in Low also rejected the
dissent's contention that the case should be remanded to allow the trial
court to clarify its theory of judgment.259 According to the majority, Rule
279 simply allows a trial court to make a written finding on an element of
a cause of action that was incompletely submitted to the jury without
objection; if the trial judge does not do so, however, nothing in the rule
247. TEX. R. Civ. P. 327(b); TEX. R. Evim. 606(b).
248. Chavarria, 75 S.W.3d at 110.
249. Id. at 111.
250. Suggs v. Fitch, 64 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.)
251. Id. at 659-60.
252. Id. at 661.
253. Id. at 662.
254. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002).
255. Id. at 562.
256. TEX. R. Civ. P. 279.
257. Low, 79 S.W.3d at 564.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 565.
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provides a basis for reversal or remand.2 60
The proper way to submit a multi-defendant negligence case was at
issue in Rosell v. Central West Motor Stages, Inc.2 61 In this wrongful
death case, the plaintiffs sued two individual drivers and Central West,
which employed one of the drivers.2 62 On appeal, the plaintiffs com-
plained that the trial court had violated the broad form submission man-
date of Rule 277263 by submitting one negligence question that included
only the two individual defendants and a separate negligent entrustment
question for Central West.2 64 The Dallas Court of Appeals disagreed,
noting that Central West's liability for its driver's negligence was undis-
puted, and that the two theories of recovery were independent and mutu-
ally exclusive.2 65 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
Central West should have been included in the jury question apportioning
responsibility among the decedent and the two individual drivers pursu-
ant to the comparative responsibility statute.2 66 Once again, the court
held that Central West would only be vicariously liable, whether based on
respondeat superior or negligent entrustment, and the degree of its own
negligence was therefore of no consequence.2 67
XII. JUDGMENTS
The Texas Supreme Court in Utts v. Short 68 clarified the circumstances
under which a non-settling defendant can claim a dollar-for-dollar settle-
ment credit against a plaintiff that the defendant alleges received the ben-
efit of settlement proceeds that were ostensibly paid to another plaintiff.
In such a case, the court held that "the nonsettling defendant must file a
written election before the trial court submits the case to the jury and
ensure that the settlement amount is in the record. '2 69 "[T]he nonsettling
defendant must present evidence to the trial court [(not the jury)] that
demonstrates nonsettling plaintiff benefited from the settlement [that]
the nonsettling defendant relies on. If the evidence shows such a benefit,
the trial court should apply the settlement credit [claimed by the defen-
260. Id. at 565-66. The four dissenting justices acknowledged that the rule cannot be
used to deem a finding contrary to the trial court's judgment. Id. at 568 (Hankinson, J.,
dissenting). The dissent argued, however, that the trial court's judgment in this case was
ambiguous, containing elements of both a DTPA and negligence recovery, and that a re-
mand was therefore appropriate. Id.
261. Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no
pet.).
262. Id. at 649.
263. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 ("In all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit
the cause upon broad form questions.").
264. Rosell, 89 S.W.3d at 653-54.
265. Id. at 654.
266. Id. at 657.
267. Id. at 656-57. Although the court noted that TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.003 (Vernon 1997) on its face requires all defendants to be listed in the apportionment
question, it held, citing just two cases, that the comparative responsibility statute had not
been applied literally in vicarious liability situations. Rosell, 89 S.W.3d at 656-57, n.9.
268. Utts v. Short, 81 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. 2002).
269. Id. at 829.
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dant] ... unless the nonsettling plaintiff presents evidence" to overcome
the presumption that the credit should be applied. 270 The court held that
the burden is on the nonsettling plaintiff to prove that he did not benefit
from the settlement because the plaintiffs are in the best position to
demonstrate how they agreed to allocate settlement amounts and how
they did or did not benefit from the settlement.271
In Miga v. Jensen272 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the mecha-
nism under which a defendant faced with an adverse monetary judgment
may stop the accrual of post-judgment interest without waiving his appel-
late rights. In this employment dispute, the plaintiff sued the defendant
for failing to make good on a promise for stock options. Between the
date of the alleged breach of the option agreement and the time of trial,
the company for which the stock options applied went public and the
stock price increased dramatically from the value of the options at the
date of the breach. Pending appeal, the defendant originally posted an
appeal bond, but after the appellate court released its decision, the par-
ties entered into an agreed order under which the defendant made an
"unconditional tender" to the plaintiff of the specified amount to termi-
nate the accrual of post-judgment interest on that amount. The result of
this tender was to save the defendant roughly $1 million annually pending
the completion of the appeal. Subsequently, however, the plaintiff ar-
gued that the tender constituted a satisfaction of the judgment, rendering
the appeal moot and waiving any appellate rights. The supreme court
disagreed, holding that a party may make an unconditional payment
while still preserving its appellate rights where "the judgment debtor
clearly expresses ... that he intends to exercise [its] right of appeal and
the appellate relief is not futile. '273
Two courts during the Survey period addressed the subject of attacking
foreign judgments that the judgment creditor sought to enforce in Texas
state courts. In Urso v. Lyon Financial Services, Inc.,274 the judgment
creditor perfected a foreign judgment in Texas and then sought to have a
receiver appointed. In his attack on the appointment of the receiver, the
judgment debtor argued that he had not received prior notice of the origi-
nal suit or its perfection in the state of Texas. Since the time for the
judgment debtor to file a motion for new trial had expired, the Houston
Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, held that the judgment debtor's
attack on the appointment of a receiver was, in essence, a collateral at-
tack on the underlying judgment that could only be pursued by a bill of
review. 275 In Cash Register Sales and Services of Houston, Inc. v. Copelco
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207 (Tex. 2002).
273. Id. at 211-12.
274. Urso v. Lyon Fin. Serv., Inc., 93 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.).
275. Id. at 280.
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Capital, Inc.,276 the judgment debtor attempted to attack the validity of a
judgment entered against it in a sister state by claiming that the signatory
to the underlying contract lacked authority to execute that agreement.
The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, rejected this argument as a
collateral attack on the merits of the underlying claim, rather than as an
attack on service of process or the exercise of jurisdiction over the person
or the subject matter.277
Finally, in Ford v. City of Lubbock 78 the plaintiff appealed a take-
nothing judgment entered as a result of a plea to the jurisdiction. The
Amarillo Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction,
holding that the appellant's notice of appeal was not timely because it
was keyed off her unfulfilled request to the trial court to enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law.279 The appellate court held that such a re-
quest was not proper because the requested findings and conclusions
would serve no purpose in the appellate court's determination of the un-
derlying jurisdictional issue.280
XIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The Houston Court of Appeals, First District, in Mahand v. Delaney,281
held that where the defendant did not receive reasonable notice of a trial
setting, it was error for the trial court to enter a post-answer default judg-
ment against him and subsequently overrule his motion for new trial.282
In this contingency fee dispute between two attorneys, the clerk advised
plaintiff's counsel in June of a new trial setting in August, and requested
that plaintiff's counsel inform all parties of the new trial setting. How-
ever, Plaintiff's counsel did not notify the defendant of the new setting
until the evening before the trial date, when plaintiff's counsel faxed a
letter to defendant's counsel at his office and had a letter couriered to his
home. Counsel for the defendant did not receive either notice until the
day of trial. The trial court then entered a default judgment against the
defendant for failing to appear at trial and subsequently denied the de-
fendant's motion for new trial.283 The appellate court reversed, holding
that under the three-part test in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.,284
the defaulted party need only show lack of reasonable notice in order to
prove that his "failure to appear was not intentional or the result of con-
scious indifference. '285 In so holding, the court extended the holding in
276. Cash Register Sales & Servs. of Houston, Inc. v. Copelco Capital, Inc., 62 S.W.3d
278 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
277. Id. at 282-83.
278. Ford v. City of Lubbock, 76 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
279. Id. at 798.
280. Id.
281. Mahand v. Delaney, 60 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
282. Id. at 375.
283. Id. at 373.
284. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., '134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939).
285. Mahand, 60 S.W.3d at 373.
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Lopez v. Lopez,286 which dispensed of the meritorious defense require-
ment in the absence of reasonable notice, and concluded that the de-
faulted party also need not prove that the delay would not cause injury to
the plaintiff.287
In Texas Sting, Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, Inc.,288 after the plaintiff filed suit,
the defendant counterclaimed. The clerk then sent several notices to
plaintiff's counsel at the address listed on the court's registry of attorneys,
rather than on the address listed on the plaintiff's petition or cover letter.
Following a missed docket call and dismissal hearing, the trial court dis-
missed the plaintiff's claims for want of prosecution and set the defen-
dant's counterclaim for trial.289 The San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that while the clerk clearly used the wrong address in notifying plaintiff's
counsel of the dismissal hearing, the plaintiff had an opportunity at the
hearing on the motion for new trial to present evidence why the dismissal
order should not be entered.290 At that hearing, however, the plaintiff
only argued it did not receive notice of the dismissal hearing and failed to
present any evidence of good cause to reinstate at the hearing. Thus, the
appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims. 291 How-
ever, the court reversed the post-answer default judgment entered against
the plaintiff because the plaintiff never had notice of the trial setting.292
Absent such notice, the court held that the plaintiff had met its burden
under Craddock, as without notice, a party's failure to appear cannot be
intentional or the result of conscious indifference. 293 Like the Mahand
court, the court in Texas Sting also concluded that it was not necessary to
prove either the second or third prong of the Craddock test to set aside
the default judgment.294
In Custom-Crete, Inc. v. K-Bar Services, Inc.,2 95 a non-attorney repre-
sentative of a corporation filed a letter denying the allegations in the
plaintiff's petition. Thereafter, the plaintiff's counsel mailed a notice to
the corporate representative that a trial on the merits would occur ap-
proximately twenty-five days later. The defendant's representative ap-
peared at trial, but was not allowed to participate in the proceedings since
he was not a licensed attorney. The trial court then entered a default
judgment against the corporation. 296 The San Antonio Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the letter filed by the defendant's representative,
286. Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1988).
287. Mahand, 60 S.W.3d at 375.
288. Tex. Sting, Ltd. v. R.B. Foods, Inc., 82 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002,
pet. denied).
289. Id. at 646-47.
290. Id. at 649.
291. Id. at 649-50.
292. Id. at 652.
293. Id. at 651-52.
294. Id. at 652.
295. Custom-Crete, Inc. v. K-Bar Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2002, no pet.).
296. Id. at 657-58.
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although technically deficient, constituted an appearance. 297 As a result,
because the corporation was provided with less than 45 days notice of the
initial trial setting, its due process rights were violated and the require-
ment of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 was not met.298 The appellate
court also held that, by appearing at the trial, the corporation did not
waive any right to complain about the defective notice since its represen-
tative was not allowed to participate in the proceedings. 299 Finally, the
court held that, under Craddock, the corporation's attempt to file an an-
swer and appear at the trial, while perhaps negligent, was not intentional
conduct or conscious indifference. 3°° Thus, the trial court erred in failing
to grant the defendant's motion for new trial.301
Finally, in In re K.C.,302 an en banc panel of the San Antonio Court of
Appeals overruled its own recent holding in In re R.H.,303 and held that
where a party's attorney appears at trial, but the party does not attend,
there is no default.30 4 Therefore, that party is not entitled to avail itself of
the Craddock test, and the trial court does not abuse its discretion in de-
nying a motion for new trial.30 5
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b(1)(a) 30 6 requires trial judges to dis-
qualify themselves in cases in which they, or another lawyer with whom
they previously practiced law, served as a lawyer with respect to the mat-
ter in controversy. 30 7 In In re O'Connor,30 8 the Texas Supreme Court
held that this rule does not limit disqualification to just those situations in
which the "same lawsuit" is involved.309 In O'Connor, the trial judge's
former law partner had represented the relator in her original divorce
action.310 Upon learning of this, the relator's new counsel in a subse-
quent action to modify the parent-child relationship moved to disqualify
the trial judge.311 The supreme court held that the original divorce action
and the modification proceeding involved the same "matter in contro-
versy" within the meaning of Rule 18b(1)(a), 312 and that the trial judge
was, therefore, disqualified from presiding over the modification
297. Id. at 658.
298. Id. at 658-59.
299. Id. at 659.
300. Id. at 660.
301. Id.
302. In re K.C., 88 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied).
303. In re R.H., 75 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.), overruled by In
re K.C., 88 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet denied).
304. K.C., 88 S.W.3d at 279.
305. Id.
306. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18b(1)(a).
307. Id.
308. In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. 2002).
309. Id. at 449.
310. Id. at 448.
311. Id.




XV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In re Nitla S.A. de C. V.3 14 presented the issue of whether counsel who
reviewed an opposing party's privileged documents, which the trial court
had ordered produced, should be disqualified when an appellate court
later ordered the documents returned. The Houston Court of Appeals,
First District, had ordered disqualification, relying on the supreme court's
previous opinion in In re Meador,315 which set forth six factors for deter-
mining whether to disqualify an attorney who obtained an opponent's
privileged information outside the normal course of discovery. 316 The su-
preme court held, however, that the Meador factors did not apply be-
cause the attorney in this case received the privileged documents directly
from the trial court in a discovery hearing. 317 Under these circumstances,
the high court ruled that "the party moving to disqualify opposing coun-
sel must show that: (1) opposing counsel's reviewing the privileged docu-
ments caused actual harm to the moving party; and (2) disqualification is
necessary, because the trial court lacks any lesser means to remedy the
moving party's harm. ' 318 Finding that the trial court correctly applied
these principles, the supreme court held that the trial court had not
abused its discretion when it refused to disqualify Nitla's counsel. 319
Hiring a consulting expert who had formerly been employed by the
defendants resulted in the disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel in In re
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. 320 The consultant in question, Caren Vale,
had been employed as an engineer in Bell's System Safety Group and, in
that capacity, worked with Bell's lawyers in defending helicopter crash
cases.32' Based on Vale's work at Bell, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
conclusively presumed that she was privy to confidential information
about Bell's defense of cases involving helicopters of the type at issue.322
Because Vale was not an attorney, however, the court could not conclu-
sively presume that she had shared, or would share, such information
with the plaintiffs' lawyers.323 Nevertheless, the court held that Vale
could not effectively be screened and, therefore, disqualification was re-
313. O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 449.
314. In re Nitla S.A. de CV., 92 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2002).
315. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998).
316. Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 421 (citing Meador, 968 S.W.2d at 351-52).
317. Id. at 423.
318. Id.
319. Id.; cf. In re Marketing Investors Corp., 80 S.W.3d 44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998,
orig. proceeding) (applying Meador factors in upholding disqualification of counsel for for-
mer corporate officer who had taken corporation's privileged documents, where such
counsel reviewed and used the privileged documents in the litigation).
320. In re Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
orig. proceeding).
321. Id. at 144.
322. Id. at 147.
323. Id. at 148.
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quired.324 In this regard, the court discounted Vale's testimony that she
had not disclosed any confidential information and had not worked on
any case involving the crash in question. 325 Instead, the court focused on
the fact that the litigation Vale was hired by plaintiffs' counsel to work on
was substantially related to other litigation she worked on for Bell involv-
ing the same model aircraft.326
Trying to avoid disqualification, plaintiffs' counsel argued that Bell had
previously designated Vale as a testifying expert in other cases, thereby
waiving any privileges with respect to confidential information she may
have possessed.32 7 The court rejected this waiver argument, however,
finding that Vale had never been designated to testify regarding the par-
ticular model at issue. 328 The court also held that plaintiffs' counsel
would not be saved from disqualification even if Vale would be called to
testify in the case as a fact witness. 329 The court noted that if called only
as a fact witness, Vale's knowledge of privileged or confidential informa-
tion would not be discoverable. 330
An opposing party's standing to move for disqualification based on a
potential conflict of interest was at issue in In re Robinson.331 After sur-
veying the relevant Texas case law, none of which it found dispositive, the
San Antonio Court of Appeals pronounced that where no "actual" con-
flict of interest exists between two co-parties represented by the same
attorney, an opposing party lacks standing to bring a motion to disqualify
based only on a potential conflict of interest.332
XVI. MISCELLANEOUS
The enforcement of arbitration agreements continued to be a subject of
dispute during the Survey period. In In re J. D. Edwards World Solutions
Co.,333 the Texas Supreme Court held that the parties' agreement to arbi-
trate all disputes "involving" the underlying contract encompassed a
party's allegation that it was fraudulently induced to enter into the con-
tract.334 The supreme court noted that the United States Supreme Court
had already distinguished "between claims of fraud in the inducement of
the arbitration agreement itself and fraud in the inducement of the con-




327. Id.; see TEx. R. Civ. P. 192.3(e), 194.2(f) (allowing discovery of facts known to
testifying expert that relate to opinions and mental impressions, regardless of when or how
factual information was acquired).
328. Bell Helicopter, 87 S.W.3d at 149-50.
329. Id. at 151.
330. Id,
331. In re Robinson, 90 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, orig. proceeding).
332. Id. at 926.
333. In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co., 87 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam).
334. Id. at 548 (applying federal law under the Federal Arbitration Act).
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contract falls within the scope of a broad arbitration agreement. '335 Al-
though the party in this matter argued that the term "involving" was
much narrower than the standard "arising under or related to" language,
the supreme court was unpersuaded. 336
In In re Halliburton Co.,337 the Texas Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee was required to arbitrate his wrongful termination claims because
he had received and implicitly accepted the employer's dispute resolution
program provided to him approximately eighteen months before his ter-
mination.338 The employer had sent notice of a new dispute resolution
program to all employees informing them that continuing employment
would constitute acceptance of the new plan.339 Among other things, the
program provided binding arbitration as the exclusive method for resolv-
ing all disputes between the company and its employees. 340 As it was
undisputed that the employee continued working after receiving notice of
the program, the only remaining issue was whether the employer had
properly changed the terms of the at-will employment contract. 341 In this
regard, the supreme court held that "[a] party asserting a change to an at-
will employment contract must prove two things: (1) notice of the change,
and (2) acceptance of the change. '342 Here, the supreme court found
that both requirements had been satisfied and, therefore, the discharged
employee's claims were subject to the arbitration agreement. 343
One case during the Survey period addressed the scope of jurisdic-
tional authority granted to visiting judges. In In re Republic Parking Sys-
tem of Texas, Inc.,344 "a visiting judge acting under a general assignment
made several pretrial rulings and set a date for trial."'345 The matter was
not reached for trial, and "the sitting judge stepped in and resumed con-
trol of the case."' 346 The relators argued that in the absence of an order
from the regional presiding judge terminating the former assignment of
the visiting judge, the case had to remain with the visiting judge.347
The Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, disagreed, noting
that visiting judges are generally assigned "either for a period of time or
for a particular case."'348 In this case, the order of assignment was for a
period of only one day. 349 If the presiding judge's assignment in this mat-
335. Id. at 550 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967)).
336. Id. at 551.
337. In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2002).
338. Id. at 569.
339. Id. at 568.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. (citing Hathoway v. Gen. Mills, Inc. 711 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. 1986)).
343. Id. at 569.
344. In re Republic Parking Sys. of Tex., Inc., 60 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, orig. proceeding).
345. Id. at 878.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 879 (citing In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex. 2001)).
349. Id. The order of assignment stated:
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ter had been for the particular case, the court would have agreed with the
relators' position that the visiting judge must remain with the case. 350
However, because the assignment in this matter was for a period of time,
which had expired, no order from the presiding judge was necessary for
the matter to revert back to the sitting judge.351
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court also addressed
whether temporary restraining orders are subject to the temporal limita-
tions set forth in Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. In In re Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission,352 the trial court entered a temporary re-
straining order on April 17, 2002, which stated that it would expire pursu-
ant to an agreement of the parties on May 13, 2002. 353 On May 10, 2002,
the plaintiffs moved to extend the temporary restraining order to June 25,
2002. 354 Defendants argued that the trial court should not extend the
temporary restraining order at all, and in no event for more than fourteen
days as set forth in Tex. R. Civ. P. 680.355 The trial court, however,
granted the extension. 356
On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the "fourteen day limitation" set
forth in Tex. R. Civ. P. 680 applied only to temporary restraining orders
that are "granted without notice. ' 357 The appellate court disagreed hold-
ing that Rule 680 governs an extension of temporary restraining order,
whether issued with or without notice, and permits only one extension for
no longer than fourteen days unless the restrained party agrees to a
longer extension.358 The court based its ruling, in part, on its belief that a
party otherwise could "obtain unlimited extensions of a temporary re-
straining order," and never need to "seek a temporary injunction, which
has more stringent proof requirements.
359
This assignment is for the period of one day, beginning the 30th day of April,
2001, provided that this assignment shall continue after the specified period
of time as may be necessary for the assigned Judge to complete trial of any
case or cases begun during this period, and to pass on motions for new trial




351. Id. at 879-80.
352. In re Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 85 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. 2002).
353. Id. at 202.
354. Id. at 202-03.
355. Id. TEX. R. Civ. P. 680 provides in part, that:
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed
with the date and hour of issuance; shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's
office and entered of record; shall define the injury and state why it is irrepa-
rable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its
terms within such time after signing, not to exceed fourteen days, as the court
fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is ex-
tended for a like period or unless the party against whom the order is di-
rected consents that it may be extended for a longer period.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 680 (emphasis added).
356. In re Tex. Natural Resource Conservation Comm'n, 85 S.W.3d at 202-03.
357. Id. at 203-04.
358. Id. at 204-05.
359. Id. at 204.
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